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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences
In 1907 England recognized the right of a felon to seek review
of his conviction,1 thus giving full effect to a slowly developed con-
cept2 that has now become so firmly entrenched in our system of
jurisprudence that few would question its value. However, the de-
velopment may not yet have ended, for the merits of appellate re-
view, so obvious and unquestioned when applied to pre-conviction
proceedings, are still accorded surprisingly little recognition when
applied to the equally crucial proceedings after conviction. Thus,
the defendant, whose rights are so amply protected while he stands
accused, is deprived of the most basic of all safeguards when it
comes to the sentence he must serve.' The paradoxical nature of
this "deliberate abandonment of the legal norm after conviction"4
is readily apparent, but in the United States5 only a minority of the
jurisdictions provide for appellate review of legal but excessive
sentences.
The position of the North Carolina Supreme Court on this
matter was reiterated in State v. Stubbs' where the defendant was
convicted of committing the "crime against nature" in violation of
section 14-177 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 7 In a vain
attempt to obtain appellate review of his sentence of imprisonment
for not less than seven nor more than ten years, he contended that
this was cruel and unusual punishment. But the court, concluding
'Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 3.
' The vox populorumn is final. Such was true of the early Roman law,
as well as early common law. Indeed, the English common law was
exceedingly slow in recognizing any judicial review in criminal cases.
When appellate review was finally recognized, it was not a matter of
right, but was permitted only upon consent of the Crown. Not until
1705 did review upon request become permissible in cases involving
misdemeanors ....
Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REv. 671, 672 (1962).
' Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal Sen-
tences, 21 BROOKLYN L. REV. 2 (1954).
' Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Pro-
cess, 75 HRv. L. REV. 904, 919 (1962).
' The United States is the only country that allows "a single judge to
set a minimum sentence at his own dictate." Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals judicial Conference, Appellate Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249,
269 (1962).
6266 N.C. 295, 145 S.E.2d 899 (1966).
TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1953).
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that the sentence was within the limits authorized by statute,' per-
sisted in its traditional approach and held that when "punishment
does not exceed the limits fixed by the statute, it cannot be con-
sidered cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense."'
North Carolina's refusal to review legal but excessive sentences
is unquestionably the same rule presently applied by the federal
courts. Under the Act of 1879 the old circuit courts held that the
statutory authority "to pronounce final sentence and to award execu-
tion thereon"'" gave them the power to render a sentence different
from that of the district court." But when the circuit courts of
appeal were created, the view was adopted that the omission of the
crucial language repealed the old law by implication in spite of some
suggestions that the power was preserved by cross reference to the
Act of 1879." The statutory authority "to affirm, modify . .. or
reverse" still exists,'" but this provision has been largely ignored
14
with the result that "since 1891, federal upper courts have unswerv-
ingly denied themselves the power to revise sentences on appeal."' 5
The most searching judicial examination of the federal position
is perhaps that of Judge Frank in the case of United States v.
Rosenberg.'6 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted of deliver-
ing information to Russia and sentenced to death under section
thirty-two of the United States Code, title fifty.' In stating his
reasons for the use of maximum punishment the trial judge dis-
played something less than detached objectivity by holding the de-
fendants responsible for causing the Korean War and altering the
'At the time of his conviction the statute authorized a sentence of not
less than five nor more than sixty years. A subsequent amendment, how-
ever, deemed the offense a felony and provided for a fine or imprisonment
in the discretion of the court. Thus, the sentence was well within the limits
of the statute under which Stubbs was convicted but, assuming that the
new statute will not be construed as providing for specific punishment and
will therefore be limited to a maximum punishment of ten years under N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-22, it approached the maximum allowable at the time of
appeal. State v. Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 880 (1963).
'266 N.C. 295, 298, 145 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1966).
" Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 3, 20 Stat. 354.
"United States v. Wynn, 11 Fed. 57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); Bates v.
United States, 10 Fed. 92 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881).
" United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 604 n.25 (2d Cir. 1952).
"28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964).
"United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605 (2d Cir. 1952).
"Id. at 604 n.25.
"195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
"Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, title I, § 2, 40 Stat. 218-19 (now 18
U.S.C. 794 (1964)).
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course of history."8 In spite of the severity of the sentence and the
somewhat shaky basis proffered, Judge Frank felt compelled to
reject the argument that section 2106 of the Judicial Code granted
the power to modify sentences on appeal. Were this a case of first
impression, he reasoned, the section would require serious consider-
ation, but because "for six decades federal decisions ... have denied
the existence of such authority, it is clear that the Supreme Court
alone is in a position to hold that Sec. 2106 confers authority to
reduce a sentence which is not outside the bounds set by a valid
statute."' 9 In addition an eighth amendment argument was rejected
because, even assuming that a sentence under a constitutional statute
could be held cruel and unusual, there were no circumstances in the
case to justify a holding that this sentence shocked the conscience
and sense of justice of the community. It is necessary, Judge Frank
said, "to treat as immaterial the sentences given (or not given) to
the other conspirators,2" and also to disregard what sentences this
court would have imposed or what other trial judges have done in
other espionage or treason cases. For such matters do not ade-
quately reflect the prevailing mood of the public."'"
The United States Supreme Court has never interpreted section
2106 in regard to the modification of sentences on appeal but it
has expressed a disinclination to enter this area. In Gore v. United
States2 the defendant received multiple sentences for an offense
consisting of a single sale of narcotics. Relying on the intent of
Congress and rejecting a double jeopardy argument, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for the Court upheld the sentences declaring
that the proper apportionment of punishment was within the do-
8 "I consider your crime worse than murder. Plain deliberate con-
templated murder is dwarfed in magnitude by comparison with the
crime you have committed. In committing the act of murder, the
criminal kills only his victim .... But in your case, I believe your
conduct... has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist aggres-
sion in Korea, with the resulting casualties exceeding 50,000 and who
knows but that millions more of innocent people may pay the price
of your treason. Indeed, by your betrayal you undoubtedly have
altered the course of history to the disadvantage of our country."
United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 605-06 n.28 (2d Cir. 1952).19Id. at 605-06.
" It is, perhaps, worthy of note that one of the conspirators, Sobell, was
sentenced to thirty years imprisonment (id. at 590) and that another who
had helped bring "to justice the arch criminals in this nefarious scheme"
received only a fifteen year sentence (id. at 606 n.28).
21 Id. at 609.
357 U.S. 386 (1958).
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main of penology and peculiarly a question of legislative policy.
Equally so, he continued, "are the much mooted problems relating
to the power of the judiciary to review sentences. First the English
and then the Scottish Courts of Criminal Appeal were given power
to revise sentences, the power to increase as well as the power to
reduce them .... This Court has no such power.
23
One case in the federal courts stands alone in this area. United
States v. Wiley2" involved five defendants, four of whom pleaded
guilty to an indictment for possession of stolen goods under sec-
tion 659 of the United States Code, title eighteen. Of these four
the ringleader, a four-time convicted felon, received a two-year
sentence and the other three, each of whom had a prior record,
received sentences of one year and a day. On the other hand Wiley,
who elected to stand trial, was convicted and sentenced to three
years even though he was, as the trial judge admitted, only a minor
participant. On appeal the Second Circuit Court of Appeals re-
manded the case for resentencing and observed, "Our part in the
administration of federal justice requires that we reject the theory
that a person may be punished because in good faith he defends
himself when charged with a crime. . . . It is evident that the
punishment imposed . . . on Wiley was . . . only in part for the
crime for which he was indicted."2 5
The situation in the federal courts, then, appears somewhat
static for the time being but there are some indications of develop-
ment in the states. No less than ten states have, between 1843 and
1964, provided express statutory authorization for appellate review
of sentences.2 6 In those jurisdictions, of course, no real problem is
encountered though a few of the courts, Arizona and Illinois for
example, proclaim that sentences will be modified only for abuse
of discretion." In only two states, New Jersey 8 and Tennessee, 9
23 Id. at 393.
2'278 F.2d 500 (1960).
'5 Id. at 504.
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1717(B) (1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 51-196 (Supp. 1963); HAWAII REv. LAWS § 212-14 (Supp. 1960); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2821 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 121-9 (Smith-
Hurd 1964); IoWA CODE ANN. § 793.18 (1946); MASS. ANN. LAws ch.
278, § 28(B) (1956); NED. Rav. STAT. § 29-2308 (1956); N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 543; ORE. REv. STAT. § 138.050 (1964). Iowa was the first
state to adopt such a statute. IOWA REv. STAT. § 47-75 (1843).
2 State v. Cuzick, 97 Ariz. 130, 397 P.2d 629 (1964); People v. Hobbs,
56 Ill. App. 2d 93, 205 N.E.2d 503 (1965). But see State v. Monks, 96
1966]
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have the courts assumed the power completely without the aid of
statute. But by far the more typical are the states with ambiguous
statutes granting the appellate courts the authority to "reverse, af-
firm, or modify the judgment"30 of the lower courts. Only a few
courts in states of this type have used the statutes to modify sen-
tences 1 but their example points up the potential for change in a
large number of states where the power is not now exercised.8 2
In North Carolina the supreme court is given statutory author-
ity in any case to "render such sentence . . . as on inspection of
the whole record it shall appear to them ought in law to be ren-
dered .... ,,"1 Although that provision appears plain enough on its
face, a search of the cases indicates that it has never been seriously
considered as a basis for the modification of sentences on appeal.
Instead, the arguments discussed by the court have repeatedly been
based either on cruel and unusual punishment or on abuse of dis-
cretion.
The court in more recent cases has made some effort, not ap-
parent in the early cases, to separate the two arguments . 4 If any
distinction can be drawn here, it would seem to be that no sentence
within the statutory limits can be considered cruel and unusual but
that a sentence within the discretion of the trial judge can be re-
viewed where there is palpable abuse. However, such a distinction
does not seem particularly valuable analytically for in either in-
stance the contention urged must ultimately be the same; i.e., under
the circumstances of the case the sentence is a greater penalty than
ought to have been imposed. In studying the cases, then, it is help-
Ariz. 354, 395 P.2d 711 (1964); State v. Evard, 55 Ill. App. 2d 270, 204
N.E.2d 777 (1965).
28 See, e.g., State v. Hall, 87 N.J. Super. 480, 210 A.2d 74 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1965).
20 See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 361, 215 S.W.2d 785 (1948).
"ARK. STAT. ch. 27, § 2144 (1947).
'1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Garramone, 307 Pa. 507, 161 At. 733
(1932).
" 1962 survey shows the number of states in which the question is
undecided as twenty-two, but of the fifteen listed as denying the power by
case law eight are shown to have statutes of the ambiguous type. Mueller,
supra note 1, at 688-97.
"3 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-11 (1953). Also worthy of consideration is the
language of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-10 (1953): "The Supreme Court has juris-
diction to review, upon appeal . . . any matter of law or legal inference."
"Compare State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 59 S.E.2d 199 (1950), with
State v. Hamby, 126 N.C. 1066, 35 S.E. 614 (1900).
1122 [Vol. 44
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ful to look at all of those in which this basic contention has been
made.
Although the contention has been rejected in almost every in-
stance regardless of the argument used, the precedent is not as firm
as the pat language of the court implies, for the early cases, later
cited as authority for denying the power of review, actually left
the question open. Thus, in one of the earliest cases in which the
contention was urged, the court found that a statute permitting the
sheriff to collect the fine of an indigent defendant by renting him
to the highest bidder was not open to the criticism that the punish-
ment was "too severe or not of an usual kind." But the court did
recognize that punishment open to that criticism would raise a ques-
tion about their power to review it.3 5 The question raised, however,
appeared to be resolved by State v. Driver8" where the court held
clearly that a five-year sentence for wife beating was cruel and un-
usual and that there could be no such anomaly as an "unconstitu-
tional judgment of an inferior Court affecting the liberty of the
citizen, not the subject of review by the Court of Appeals, where
every order or judgment involving a matter of law or legal inference
is reviewable !""7
The cases following Driver involved relatively short sentences,
typically two years or less, and rarely provided the court with an
opportunity to invoke that holding. However, the possibility was
not foreclosed for in each case the court found reason to point out
either that the discretion had not been abused or that the sentence
did not err on the side of severity.3 8 Undeniably, the question was
still open in 1914 for in State v. Lee,3 9 where the conviction of a
Negro boy for robbery of eleven cents was reversed for error in
the charge, the court said that while it was unnecessary to decide
the extent of their power to review the judge's discretion, a nine-
year sentence was not commensurate with such an offense. Again,
State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838).'°78 N.C. 423 (1878).
Id. at 427."B See, e.g., State v. Dowdy, 145 N.C. 432, 58 S.E. 1002 (1907); State
v. Farrington, 141 N.C. 844, 53 S.E. 954 (1906); State v. Rippy, 127 N.C.
516, 37 S.E. 148 (1900); State v. Hamby, 126 N.C. 1066, 35 S.E. 614
(1900); State v. Apple, 121 N.C. 584, 28 S.E. 469 (1897); State v. Reid,
106 N.C. 714, 11 S.E. 315 (1890); State v. Miller, 94 N.C. 904 (1886);
State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 367 (1879).
166 N.C. 250, 80 S.E. 977 (1914).
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in State v. Woodlief4 ° where the sentence was only thirty days, the
court said, "We are not prepared to say that this Court cannot
review the judge as to the quantum of punishment, even where
there is a limit set to the exercise of his discretion; but if the right
exists, we will not do so except in a plain case. ... 41
In spite of this precedent the court in 1929 dismissed the con-
tention out of hand. In State v. Daniels42 the court in a per curiam
opinion held, apparently for the first time, that a sentence authorized
by law "cannot be held to be 'cruel or unusual.' 3 However, not
one of the four cases cited in support of this proposition had failed
to consider the possibility of reviewing sentences and certainly none
of them had foreclosed it.4 4 Four years later the court went so far
as to cite Woodlief and State v. Jones45 for a similar holding."
Since the court said in Jones that there was nothing in the record
to show abuse of discretion and in Woodlief that the quantum of
punishment might be reviewed in a proper case, the authority is at
least questionable. But the language, once used, was soon followed
and in 1940 the error was compounded when in State v. Brackett"
the court cited Daniels for the same easy rule.
In the next twenty years there was from time to time a slight
recognition that some limitation existed but on the whole the prec-
edent was taken as established.4" For example, where a defendant
sought review of a sentence for obtaining money by false pretenses,
the court answered that authorized punishment could not be cruel
and unusual and that the discretion of the trial judge could be re-
viewed "only in case of manifest gross abuse."49 But the possibility
of gross abuse occurring seems to have diminished considerably
40172 N.C. 885, 90 S.E. 137 (1916).
"Id. at 891, 90 S.E. at 140.
"197 N.C. 285, 148 S.E. 244 (1929).
"Id. at 286, 148 S.E. at 244.
"State v. Dowdy, 145 N.C. 432, 58 S.E. 1002 (1907); State v. Farring-
ton, 141 N.C. 844, 53 S.E. 954 (1906) ; State v. Pettie, 80 N.C. 367 (1879);
State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144 (1838).
"181 N.C. 543, 106 S.E. 827 (1921).
"State v. Fleming, 202 N.C. 512, 163 S.E. 453 (1932).
'7218 N.C. 369, 11 S.E.2d 146 (1940).
"'See, e.g., State v. Downey, 253 N.C. 348, 117 S.E.2d 39 (1960) ; State
v. Lee, 247 N.C. 230, 100 S.E.2d 372 (1957); State v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77,
59 S.E.2d 199 (1950) ; State v. White, 230 N.C. 513, 53 S.E.2d 436 (1949) ;
State v. Richardson, 221 N.C. 209, 19 S.E.2d 863 (1942); State v. Parker,
220 N.C. 416, 17 S.E.2d 475 (1941); State v. Wilson, 218 N.C. 769, 12
S.E.2d 654 (1941).
" State v. Stansbury, 230 N.C. 589, 55 S.E.2d 185 (1949).
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when the court decided State v. Wright in 1964.50 In that case the
defendant forged a check for only a small amount but was sentenced
to prison for seven to ten years. The court noted that no more than
ten years could be given for a check large enough to break a bank,
quoted Woodlief to point out that there is a limit to the trial judge's
discretion, but then concluded, "If the sentence is disproportionately
long, the Governor and the Board of Paroles have ample authority
to make adjustment. This Court, lacking such authority, must af-
firm the judgment."51
Thus, the rule in North Carolina and the majority of jurisdic-
tions in this country is, undeniably, no appellate review of legal
sentences. But a potential for change exists. In many jurisdictions,
including North Carolina, there is statutory authority available to
a willing court. And in North Carolina and the federal courts there
is a precedent, however thin, that can be argued in a proper case.
Also, proposed congressional bills indicate forthcoming legislative
scrutiny." Further, the recently established principle of applying
the eighth amendment to the states53 and the correlative tendency
to examine sentences more closely5 4 suggests that reluctant state
courts and legislatures may yet be prodded by the federal courts.
An example of this possibility occurred recently in the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals when a state prisoner, sentenced to life im-
prisonment without possibility of parole under an habitual criminal
statute, sought federal habeas corpus on the ground that the sen-
tence was so excessive as to constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment. The district judge relied on precedent established before
Robinson v. California to reject the contention but the circuit court
of appeals, while instructing the petitioner to exhaust his state
remedies, held that reliance on such authority was no longer ade-
quate. 55
Perhaps the strongest argument for the appellate review of legal
sentences is the opportunity it provides for the establishment of a
jurisdiction-wide sentencing policy that would reflect current penol-
ogy. Under the present rule it is manifest that the "courts are
::261 N.C. 356, 134 S.E.2d 624 (1964).
Id. at 358, 134 S.E.2d at 625.
52 S. 2722, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963) (dissenting opinion);
Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (1966), 44 N.C.L. REV. 818.
" Goss v. Bomar, 337 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1964).
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governed by individual and varying philosophies of crime control
rather than by an orderly and consistent approach for the judiciary
as a whole." 6 Thus, in North Carolina a trial judge remains free
to follow such maxims as the one cited by the supreme court in
1925, "The deterrence theory is the kingdom of the criminal law."' 7
But, quite aside from differences in active philosophies, the more
frightening, though hopefully more rare, possibility exists for arbi-
trary and emotional judgments or simple mistake."s This is not to
suggest that all discretion should be taken from the trial judge but
rather that the objective should be "to provide a technique whereby
discretion shall be allowed ample creative scope and yet be subject
to some degree of discipline."5 Without such discipline trial judges
are left in a lonely position indeed and respect for the law on the
part of those who come under its scrutiny suffers.
MARTIN N. ERWIN
Criminal Law-Nolle Prosequi With Leave-Possibility of Abuse
On February 24, 1964, an Orange County grand jury indicted
Peter Klopfer for a trespass that had occurred on January 3, 1964.
The defendant entered a plea of not guilty during a special criminal
session of Orange County Superior Court in March, 1964. The
jury was unable to agree on a verdict, and a mistrial was declared.
The defendant was ordered to return for retrial during the same
session, but the case was not reached at this time. Approximately
one year later the solicitor indicated to the defendant's attorney
that he intended to have a nolle prosequi1 with leave entered. At
" Bennett, The Sentence-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation, 1960
U. ILL. L.F. 500.
= State v. Swindell, 189 N.C. 151, 155, 126 S.E. 417, 418 (1925).
In Stubbs it should be noted that the trial judge obviously intended to
fix the sentence on the lower end of the permitted scale. In view of the
fact that the old statute allowed a fifty-five year range of discretion, almost
any factor could have caused him to add two. years to the minimum. It is
at least open to speculation that under the new statute the sentence would
have been fixed at the lower end of the new scale, yet under the existing
system the judicary must leave the correction of its mistakes to other
branches of government.
"' Second Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference, Appellate Re-
view of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 273 (1962).
'Nolle prosequi will hereinafter be abbreviated as nol. pros.
[Vol. 441126
